Contribution ID: 4558691f-535e-493e-a5af-38b9983145a9

Date: 07/01/2021 18:51:05

Public Consultation for the Revision of the Guidelines on State aid for Environmental protection and Energy 2014-2020 (EEAG)

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

Target audience

The Commission is interested in hearing your views on the revision of the Energy and Environmental State aid guidelines ('EEAG'). It is particularly keen to hear from :

- National and regional competent authorities involved in the granting of aid
- National regulatory authorities (energy and environmental protection)
- Competition authorities
- Businesses, including SMEs and micro enterprises
- Associations representing businesses
- Interest groups professionally involved in the fight for environmental protection and against climate change, e.g. think tanks, green NGOs
- Groups representing consumers
- Transmission and distribution system operators
- Members of academia
- The general public.

Comments and information from any other stakeholders not explicitly mentioned above are also welcomed.

Why we are consulting

The aim of the consultation is to allow interested parties to provide their feedback regarding the design of the future **Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy** (**EEAG**) that will apply from 1 January 2022 and the related articles in the **General Block Exemption Regulation** (**GBER**) (art. 36 to 49 of the GBER). The review of the EEAG and related GBER articles will occur against the background of the European Grean Deal, which aims at achieving climate neutrality in 2050 and transforming the EU economy into a circular economy thriving for zero-pollution, where natural capital is protected. The present consultation aims to collect views and information on the review of the current rules. In particular, it aims to collect the views on the scope of and conditions for national aid measures that promote the fight against climate change, support environmental protection and ensure security of energy supply. All the measures should be necessary, proportionate and effective, should do not generate undue distortions of competition and trade in the single market.

Background

Introduction

The EEAG enable Member States to fund projects for environmental protection, energy infrastructure and security of energy supply in a cost-effective and non-distortive way, protecting competition and trade in the single market.

Member States can also grant aid for environmental purposes in accordance with the GBER. This Regulation allows Member States to grant aid for smaller and simpler projects without the need to notify the measure to the Commission in advance, provided the aid meets a number of predefined criteria. These criteria are derived from the Commission experience with notified measures and reflect those established in the EEAG, although generally with lower aid intensities to account for the fact that the Commission does not examine these measures ex-ante.

The EEAG entered into force in 2014 together with the relevant provisions of the GBER. Both acts were applicable until 31 December 2020 but the Commission has prolonged their validity until 31 December 2021 and 31 December 2023 respectively.

The revision of the EEAG and the related provisions of the GBER occurs against the backdrop of recent regulatory changes (notably the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework, the Clean Energy Package, the Clean Mobility Package, the Circular Economy Package), as well as the Commission's intention to make Europe fit for the Digital Agenda, the Industrial Strategy and the European Green Deal initiative that aims to transform the EU into a carbon neutral economy by 2050, as well as into a circular economy thriving for zero-pollution, where natural capital is protected (see <u>Green Deal Communication</u> and the various initiatives announced in the <u>Roadmap</u>). In addition, in September 2020 the Commission proposed to increase the EU's climate ambition for 2030 to a reduction of at least 55% compared to 1990, including carbon removals. To that effect, it will put forward proposals for the revision of key climate and energy legislation by June 2021.

In addition, the revision will have to take into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Member States' economies (including citizens) and their funding capabilities together with the deployment of the Recovery Plan for Europe.

This consultation follows the results of the <u>'fitness check'</u>. Although the EEAG and related provisions in GBER have generally delivered on their objectives, the following issues are noticed:

- a) There are indications that the scope of the guidelines might have been too restricted and that the guidelines are too tightly focused on specific aid categories and technologies. They are thus not sufficiently future-proof, to cater for recent and expected technological and market developments and novel aid designs.
- b) There are some indications that the compatibility rules on environmental protection are not entirely suited to face the climate neutrality challenge, in particular the rules to ensure necessity of aid, proportionality and limitation of distortions.
- c) It is very difficult to measure whether the redistribution of costs inherent in the reductions to Energy

Intensive Users (EIUs) from energy charges really increases the acceptability of the underlying policy from the perspective of public opinion. Furthermore, the correlation between the existence of EIU reductions and the introduction of ambitious renewables policies is uncertain.

- d) More could be done to contribute to the Energy Union, by aligning to the more recent legislation in the energy field and further promoting competition and market integration. In addition, more could be done to align to more recent legislation in the sphere of environmental protection (including climate protection).
- e) Finally, there is scope for further clarifying and simplifying a series of concepts and provisions, taking into account additional case practice and experience.

This consultation focuses on issues a) to c) where more evidence and information is required, in line with the Commission's Better Regulation requirements.

The EEAG are not the only set of guidelines that contain compatibility criteria for aid schemes supporting the achievement of the objectives of the Green Deal. Other guidelines can also be of relevance, like the Framework on Aid for research and development and innovation or the Communication on State aid to important projects of common European interest or the Guidelines on State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas. This consultation does not focus on areas covered by those other guidelines.

The information collected through this consultation will be used by the Commission to prepare the impact assessment for the future EEAG and relevant parts of GBER. The questionnaire is available in the three Commission working languages (English, French and German) and replies can be submitted in all official EU languages.

A summary report of the public consultation will also be published in the spring of 2021 on the official public consultations page of the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say en). The final report will be published in the autumn of 2021 on the same website.

In a separate but linked exercise, DG Competition has also published a call for contributions on questions about how competition rules and sustainability policies work together, and how competition rules can best support the Green Deal, including open questions on whether and how to deal with support to projects which can have negative impact on the environment or whether more support should be granted to projects with high environmental value. More information is available here: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/information/green_deal/index_en.html.

About you

* 1 L	anguage	of my	contribution
-------	---------	-------	--------------

- Bulgarian
- Croatian
- Czech
- Danish
- Dutch

0	English
0	Estonian
0	Finnish
0	French
0	German
0	Greek
0	Hungarian
0	Irish
0	Italian
0	Latvian
0	Lithuanian
0	Maltese
0	Polish
0	Portuguese
0	Romanian
0	Slovak
0	Slovenian
0	Spanish
0	Swedish
*21a	m giving my contribution as
0	Academic/research institution
0	Business association
0	Company/business organisation
0	Consumer organisation
0	EU citizen
0	Environmental organisation
0	Non-EU citizen
0	Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
0	Public authority
0	Trade union
0	Other
*3 Fi	rst name
	Anne

*4 Surname			
STAUFFER			
*5 Email (this won't be	published)		
anne@env-health.org			
*7 Organisation name			
255 character(s) maximum			
Health and Environment	Alliance (HEAL)		
*8 Organisation size			
Micro (1 to 9 em	plovees)		
Small (10 to 49)	. ,		
Medium (50 to 2	. ,		
Large (250 or m	ore)		
9 Transparency regis	ter number		
255 character(s) maximum			
	<u></u>	er. It's a voluntary database fo	r organisations seeking to
influence EU decision-makin	g.		
00723343929-96			
*10 Country of origin			
Please add your country of o	rigin or that of your organi	sation	
Afghanistan	Djibouti	Libya	Saint Martin
Aland Islands	Dominica	Liechtenstein	Saint Pierre
riana iolanao	Bommoa	Lioditioniotom	and Miquelon
Albania	Dominican	Lithuania	Saint Vincent
Albailla		Littiuariia	and the
	Republic		Grenadines
O Algoria	Ecuador	Luxembourg	Samoa
Algeria	Louadoi	Luxembourg	Janioa

Macau

Madagascar

American

Samoa

Andorra

Egypt

El Salvador

San Marino

Príncipe

São Tomé and

Angola	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Saudi Arabia
Anguilla	Eritrea	Malaysia	Senegal
Antarctica	Estonia	Maldives	Serbia
Antigua and Barbuda	Eswatini	Mali	Seychelles
Argentina	Ethiopia	Malta	Sierra Leone
Armenia	Falkland Islands	Marshall Islands	Singapore
Aruba	Faroe Islands	Martinique	Sint Maarten
Australia	Fiji	Mauritania	Slovakia
Austria	Finland	Mauritius	Slovenia
Azerbaijan	France	Mayotte	SolomonIslands
Bahamas	French Guiana	Mexico	Somalia
Bahrain	French Polynesia	Micronesia	South Africa
Bangladesh	FrenchSouthern andAntarctic Lands	Moldova	South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
Barbados	Gabon	Monaco	South Korea
Belarus	Georgia	Mongolia	South Sudan
Belgium	Germany	Montenegro	Spain
Belize	Ghana	Montserrat	Sri Lanka
Benin	Gibraltar	Morocco	Sudan
Bermuda	Greece	Mozambique	Suriname
Bhutan	Greenland	Myanmar	Svalbard and
		/Burma	Jan Mayen
Bolivia	Grenada	Namibia	Sweden
Bonaire SaintEustatius andSaba	Guadeloupe	Nauru	Switzerland
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Guam	Nepal	Syria

BotswanaBouvet IslandBrazilBritish Indian	GuatemalaGuernseyGuineaGuinea-Bissau	NetherlandsNew CaledoniaNew ZealandNicaragua	TaiwanTajikistanTanzaniaThailand
Ocean Territory British Virgin Islands	Guyana	Niger	The Gambia
Brunei	Haiti	Nigeria	Timor-Leste
Bulgaria	Heard Island and McDonald Islands	Niue	Togo
Burkina Faso	Honduras	Norfolk Island	Tokelau
Burundi	Hong Kong	NorthernMariana Islands	Tonga
Cambodia	Hungary	North Korea	Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon	Iceland	North Macedonia	Tunisia
Canada	India	Norway	Turkey
Cape Verde	Indonesia	Oman	Turkmenistan
Cayman Islands	Iran	Pakistan	Turks and Caicos Islands
Central AfricanRepublic	Iraq	Palau	Tuvalu
Chad	Ireland	Palestine	Uganda
Chile	Isle of Man	Panama	Ukraine
China	Israel	Papua New Guinea	United Arab Emirates
Christmas Island	Italy	Paraguay	UnitedKingdom
Clipperton	Jamaica	Peru	United States
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	Japan	Philippines	United StatesMinor OutlyingIslands
Colombia	Jersey	Pitcairn Islands	Uruguay

Comoros	Jordan	0	Poland	0	US Virgin
					Islands
Congo	Kazakhstan		Portugal		Uzbekistan
Cook Islands	Kenya		Puerto Rico		Vanuatu
Costa Rica	Kiribati		Qatar		Vatican City
Côte d'Ivoire	Kosovo		Réunion		Venezuela
Croatia	Kuwait		Romania		Vietnam
Cuba	Kyrgyzstan		Russia		Wallis and
					Futuna
Curaçao	Laos		Rwanda		Western
					Sahara
Cyprus	Latvia		Saint		Yemen
			Barthélemy		
Czechia	Lebanon		Saint Helena		Zambia
			Ascension and		
			Tristan da		
			Cunha		
Democratic	Lesotho		Saint Kitts and		Zimbabwe
Republic of the			Nevis		
Congo					
Denmark	Liberia		Saint Lucia		

*20 Publication privacy settings

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

Anonymous

Only your contribution, country of origin and the respondent type profile that you selected will be published. All other personal details (name, organisation name and size, transparency register number) will not be published.

Public

Your personal details (name, organisation name and size, transparency register number, country of origin) will be published with your contribution.

I agree with the personal data protection provisions

The questionnaire is organised in two parts – part one is more general covering various **energy and environmental issues** and part two deals specifically with aid in the form of reduced energy charges for **energy intensive users** (EIUs).

A) Environmental protection and energy

[Environmental protection should be understood as covering covers all measures that contribute to the protection of the environment, including the fight against climate change, across the various sectors of the economy, including through the deployment of clean energy sources]

A.1) Context

22 Do you consider that due to the COVID19-pandemic, the ensuing recession as well as the national policy response and taking into account the European response through the Recovery Plan and the Next Generation package:

·	Yes	No	I don't know /No opinion
Your country will redirect public resources to environmental protection including decarbonisation?	0	0	•
Your country will have enough resources to support environmental protection including decarbonisation?	0	0	•
The difference between Member States' resources to support environmental protection including decarbonisation have increased since 2019?	•	0	0

A.2) Necessity for aid

In the light of technological progress and market evolutions (significant decrease in equipment costs), it might be that State aid possibilities for environmental protection purposes should either be more restricted or be subject to stricter conditions or on the contrary widened to achieve the Green Deal objectives.

23 In your opinion, should aid be allowed for the following areas?

With regard to the area of **biodiversity**, please note the following. Measures to promote biodiversity and nature capital, as long as they constitute state aid, can fall under Article 53 GBER, or Article 29 of the Agricultural Block Exemption Regulation (ABER) or they may qualify as a Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI), while support for biodiversity measures are excluded from the current EEAG. Stakeholders are here asked to explain whether they believe that aid should also be granted under the EEAG for biodiversity insofar as it is not covered by the other provisions.

·	Yes, in the same way as today	Yes and more than before (higher aid intensities or new aid forms)	Yes, but subject to stricter conditions	Yes but subject to lower aid intensities /amounts	For certain types of installations only within the category (Please specify)	No: aid is no longer needed	No: aid is too distortive	No: aided measure is not beneficial for the environment	Don't know /No opinion.
Renewable electricity	0	•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Renewable heating /cooling	0	•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Renewable and low carbon hydrogen production	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alternative transport fuel (other than hydrogen)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Combined Heat and Power (CHP)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
District heating /cooling	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Energy efficiency in production processes	0	©	0	•	©	0	•	•	0
Energy efficiency in buildings	0	•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Industrial decarbonisation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Solid) Waste recycling	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Resource efficiency /Circular economy (water)	0	•	0	0	©	0	0	0	0
Resource efficiency /Circular economy (waste heat)	0	•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Low/zero emission vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Low/zero emission transport infrastructure	0	•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carbon Capture and Use (CCU)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Energy storage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demand response	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Energy infrastructure	0	•	0	0	©	0	©	©	0
Biodiversity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other (e.g., reduction of pollutants beyond EU standards). Please specify	©	•	0	©	©	©	©	©	•

24 If you selected 'other', please specify.

1000 character(s) maximum

It is key that the new EEAG guidelines help to implement the zero pollution ambition of the Green Deal, and contribute to the implementation of zero pollution measures. EU air quality standards are weaker than what WHO recommends and what the latest science tells us about impacts. The health burden of pollution, also from chemical exposures, is unacceptably high in the EU, therefore additional and ramped up aid should be provided to decrease pollution release and exposure as fast as possible, also to protect future generations.

A.3) Type of aid / aid instrument

A.3.1) Eligible costs: operating versus investment expenses

26 In your opinion, should aid covering operating costs (in particular energy costs and raw material costs) on top of investment costs be generally allowed for the following areas?

With regard to the area of **biodiversity**, please note the following. Measures to promote biodiversity and nature capital, as long as they constitute state aid, can fall under Article 53 GBER, or Article 29 of the Agricultural Block Exemption Regulation (ABER) or they may qualify as a Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI), while support for biodiversity measures are excluded from the current EEAG. Stakeholders are here asked to explain whether they believe that aid should also be granted under the EEAG for biodiversity insofar as it is not covered by the other provisions.

	Yes	Yes but only with sufficient safeguards against undue competition distortion	No, aid covering investment costs is normally sufficient to incentivise a project	No because surcharges financing the support would increase too much	l don't know
Renewable electricity	0	0	0	0	•
Renewable heating/cooling	0	0	0	0	•
Renewable and low carbon hydrogen production	0	•	©	©	•
Alternative transport fuel (other than hydrogen)	0	•	•	•	•
Combined Heat and Power (CHP)	0	0	0	0	•

District heating /cooling	0	•	•	0	•
Energy efficiency in production processes	0	•	•	©	•
Energy efficiency in buildings	0	•	•	•	•
Industrial decarbonisation	0	0	0	0	•
(Solid) Waste recycling	0	0	0	©	•
Resource efficiency /Circular economy (water)	0	•	•	•	•
Resource efficiency /Circular economy (waste heat)	0	•	•	©	•
Low/zero emission vehicles	0	0	0	©	•
Low/zero emission transport infrastructure	0	•	•	©	•
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)	0	0	0	•	•
Carbon Capture and Use (CCU)	0	•	•	•	•
Energy storage	0	0	0	0	•
Demand response	0	0	0	•	•
Energy infrastructure	0	0	0	0	•
Biodiversity	0	0	0	0	•

Other (please	0	0	0	0	•
specify)					

A.3.2) Form of the aid: operating aid versus investment aid

28 Do you think that aid paid out as a premium covering the difference between the production costs for one unit and the revenues is more suited than aid paid ex ante as a share of the investment costs in any of the following areas?

·	Yes – because operating aid can more easily be designed to precisely match the funding gap (eg. adapting over time to market revenues)	Yes – because operating aid allows the payments to be spread over the project lifetime rather than requiring an immediate disbursement from the budget	No – because operating aid is more distortive	No – because operating aid is generally financed from surcharges on the product	I don't know /No opinion
Renewable electricity	0	0	0	0	•
Renewable heating/cooling	•	•	0	0	•
Renewable and low carbon hydrogen production	©	©	©	©	•
Alternative transport fuel (other than hydrogen)	©	•	0	0	•
Combined Heat and Power (CHP)	0	0	0	0	•
District heating /cooling	0	0	0	0	•
Energy efficiency in production processes	©	•	0	©	•
Energy efficiency in buildings	0	0	0	0	•

Industrial decarbonisation	•	©	0	0	•
(Solid) Waste recycling	0	0	0	0	0
Resource efficiency /Circular economy (water)	•	•	0	0	•
Resource efficiency /Circular economy (waste heat)	•	•	•	•	•
Low/zero emission vehicles	0	•	0	0	•
Low/zero emission transport infrastructure	•	•	0	0	•
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)	0	•	0	0	•
Carbon Capture and Use (CCU)	0	0	0	0	•
Energy storage	0	0	0	0	•
Demand response	0	0	0	0	•
Energy infrastructure	0	0	0	0	•
Biodiversity	0	0	0	0	•
Other (please specify)	0	0	0	0	•

30 Do you think operating aid for environmental protection impacts the aid beneficiary's behaviour on the energy or product market differently than investment aid?

	Voc
\sim	Yes

0

O No

I don't know

33 Various different instruments have been used to incentivise investments in renewable energy that pay beneficiaries over the project lifetime – for example fixed feed in premiums that pay a fixed subsidy for each unit of output, variable premiums that pay a top up equal to the difference between the market value of the output and a predefined price, and two way contracts for difference that pay this top up in the same way as a variable premium but also oblige the beneficiary to make a payback if market prices go above the predefined price level.

Do you think that these methods are equivalent in terms of incentivising new investments while keeping and product markets distortions limited to the minimum?

- Yes all of them allow investments to be financed and take account of market revenues.
- No fixed premiums are superior because they leave market participants more exposed to market price signals and adapt production to real demand.
- No variable premiums are superior over fixed premiums as they are adapting to real costs.
- No two-way contracts for difference are superior because they guard against overcompensation.
- Other (please explain)
- I don't know/No opinion

35 The introduction of carbon contracts (for difference) has been suggested to further incentivise the decarbonisation of the industry. Such contracts would reimburse the extra costs resulting from decarbonisation by paying the investor the difference between the costs of reducing one ton of CO2 for the production of a given product (steel, cement, fertilisers, etc.) and the actual CO2 price in the ETS, bridging the cost gap compared to conventional production of the given product. Such type of contract would create a further incentive for industries to invest into decarbonisation technologies beyond the ETS incentive by removing uncertainties about the profitability of the investment and guarantee a certain rate of return for the investment.

Do you agree with the above statement and thus consider that this type of support should be allowed?

Those contracts for difference can be one way contracts (the difference in costs is paid to the producer of the industrial product when decarbonisation costs are higher than the carbon price or two-ways if the industrial producer also has to pay back the difference when the decarbonisation costs are below the carbon price.

- Yes
- [◎] No
- I don't know

39 Do you think that carbon contract for difference for the industry would imply certain risks for competition on the market?

- Yes
- O No
- I don't know

A.3.3) Aid intensities - Funding gap

For investment aid, the EEAG and the GBER use two approaches to calculating the amount of aid that a project can receive: i) **funding gap** (for energy infrastructure, for district heating and cooling networks and for CO2 capture, transport and storage); and ii) **aid intensities**.

According to a **funding gap** approach, all revenues and expenses over the lifetime of the investment, discounted to their current value (typically using the cost of capital) are forecasted. If the sum of the discounted cash flows is negative for the investment, aid can be awarded to cover the entire gap. The funding gap approach requires a thorough business plan. The funding gap can be calculated only on project per project basis.

Aid intensities, on the other hand, limit the aid awarded to a certain percentage (so-called maximum aid intensity) of the extra investment cost of the project which needs to be incurred to reach the environmental or energy objective compared with a defined counterfactual. This approach was chosen in 2014 for investment aid for equipment producing energy or products. It was considered to ensure predictability, be easy to use and to ensure a level playing field when comparing projects within a specific category. Aid intensities were calculated to roughly approximate the funding gap of a certain number of standard projects observed before 2014. In the meantime, however, new technologies have been developed.

42 Do you think that aid intensities combined with the use of a counterfactual should be maintained as a way to measure the proportionality of the aid?

The counterfactual allows excluding costs to cover the standard (and more polluting) equipment to conduct the activities concerned.

- Yes because easy to use
- Yes in particular under the GBER
- Yes in particular for small projects
- Yes but only for standard projects where costs and counterfactual are well established.

No – because aid amount is never correctly calibrated

No – because counterfactual is difficult to identify

I don't know

43 Please indicate if you consider there are specific types of investments where applying aid intensities would be particularly useful:

Renewable electricity

Renewable heating/cooling

Renewable and low carbon hydrogen production

Alternative transport fuel (other than hydrogen)

Combined Heat and Power (CHP)

District heating/cooling

Energy efficiency in production processes

Energy efficiency in buildings

Industrial decarbonisation

(Solid) Waste recycling

Resource efficiency/Circular economy (water)

Resource efficiency/Circular economy (waste heat)

Low/zero emission vehicles

Low/zero emission transport infrastructure

Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)

Carbon Capture and Use (CCU)

Energy storage

Demand response

Energy infrastructure

Biodiversity

Other (Please specify)

49 Are you aware of projects eligible for support for environmental protection under the EEAG or GBER, which were not implemented because the aid intensity allowed under the EEAG or GBER did not make the project sufficiently financially attractive?

Yes

No

52 Do you have experience with the funding gap (as explained above) approach in receiving or granting of aid?

- Yes
- 56 Do you think that a claw back mechanism should be introduced to avoid excessive funding?
 - Yes
 - No
 - I don't know/No opinion

A.4) Aid award procedure: Transparency, broadening, cross border opening, competitive bidding process, public consultation, avoiding investment flow interruption

This section seeks views on potential competition distortions that may result from the continued and increasing use of State aid for environmental protection, as well as the pros and cons of various tools that could be used to reduce these distortions.

63 There are various situations, in which State aid for environmental protection might pose a risk to fair and equal competition, such as:

- Overcompensation (projects receive more aid than needed to carry out the investment/activity)
- Crowding-out of private investment (aid granted to projects which would have taken place without aid anyway or reducing the private incentive to invest)
- **Greenwashing** (projects claiming aid for alleged higher environmental benefits, while the real environmental benefits they provide are very low)
- Lack of cost-effectiveness (the cheapest projects to fulfil the environmental objective are not chosen)
- Deep pockets distortions (Member States with greater financial resources being able to over subsidise environmental protection activities in their territory, giving a competitive advantage to firms located in their territory).

On a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very important), how important is it that State aid rules seek to minimise/prevent these risks?

	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know /No opinion
Overcompensation	0	0	0	0	0	•

Crowding-out of private investment	0	0	0	0	0	•
Greenwashing	0	0	0	0	•	•
Lack of cost effectiveness	•	0	0	0	0	0
Deep pockets distortions	•	0	0	0	0	0

A.4.1) Transparency of environmental protection costs

Transparency in this section refers to the transparency of the environmental protection cost. State aid rules could more systematically require Member States to identify the contribution to environmental protection in monetary terms in a harmonised manner, as cost (in EUR) per unit of environmental protection achieved (as for example, EUR aid per tCO2 emissions reduced) [or, where other objectives are identified, eg. EUR per measureable unit of improvement of air/water/soil quality or biodiversity].

Increasing the transparency of the cost in this way could provide a basis for ensuring aid is necessary, as well as comparing and choosing between different types of project that contribute to the same objective. Making the costs transparent might also discourage Member States from picking relatively expensive means to meet the targeted objective and reducing the risk that targeted support is used to support national industry rather than as an efficient means of increasing environmental protection, bearing in mind the need to support the development of technologies to decarbonise production processes that currently face high abatement costs in view of the climate neutrality objective by 2050.

For decarbonisation costs, such a calculation would need to take into account direct savings from the activity as well as emissions linked to primary energy consumption – for example, switching from a gas boiler to an electric boiler would reduce emissions because gas would no longer be burned to fire the boiler. The calculation would need to make assumptions about the carbon intensity of the electricity used to power the electric boiler. Similarly, for support for renewable electricity this could require a calculation taking into account estimates of the hours in which the supported generation would run, and the type of alternative electricity production that it would displace in these hours.

64 Do you think a calculation of the cost per tCO2 emissions reduced should be reported for aid measures targeting decarbonisation for the sake of transparency?

- Not at all
- Rather not
- Neither yes nor no
- Rather yes
- Yes, fully
- I don't know

65 Please explain the reason for your response.

1000 character(s) maximum

We support requirements on cost-benefit analysis and monetisation, not only to improve transparency but also strengthen comprehensive, evidence-based policy-making. Such an analysis also has to consider

health impacts+benefits, in order to avoid trade-offs. Methods to calculate health benefits of mitigation actions exist, even though they are not comprehensive yet (focus only on air pollution benefits, not combined benefits from climate impacts avoided, cleaner air, and strengthened health overall). The Commission should establish a consultation mechanism with experts and stakeholders to develop the methodology further.

However, the outcome of these calculations should not be the decisive factor for MS support schemes. MS need to retain the flexibility for aid measures that are not necessarily the cheapest ones, if necessary for reaching a desired Green Deal objective, and also because not all benefits can and will be quantified. So the seemingly cheapest option can be biased.

For other environmental protection objectives, such a calculation can also be complex, in particular when environmental protection projects tackle several types of environmental impacts. Allocating the costs to the various environmental benefits can be complicated. For instance, an investment that allows a company to both consume less water and release less pollutants in the air and water may be complex to convert into a cost per unit of pollution avoided. Also the types of pollution avoided vary and cannot be compared amongst each other. In those cases, instead of a cost per unit of environmental benefit, it might be more useful to require the quantification of the expected different environmental benefits of a given investment.

66 For environmental protection objectives other than decarbonisation, do you think that a calculation of the actual cost per unit of environmental benefit or where not possible a requirement for quantifying the actual environmental benefits of support measures should be required as part of the compatibility conditions:

- Not at all
- Rather not
- Neither yes nor no
- Rather yes
- Yes, fully
- I don't know

67 How do you rate aid intensities compared to a funding gap approach in terms of the likelihood of generating a reasonable rate of return or an excessive rate of return?

- Aid intensities are more likely than funding gap to lead to an excessive rate of return (because the aid intensity is too generous and/or ignores important savings/revenues)
- Funding gap method is more likely to lead to an excessive rate of return (because costs and revenues cannot correctly be forecasted)
- When combined with a claw back mechanism (i.e. a mechanism that ensures that aid has to be reimbursed if actual costs are lower than foreseen

in the funding gap calculation or when revenues are higher than initially planned), the funding gap method is more likely to lead to reasonable a rate of return than aid intensities

- Both approaches are equivalent
- I don't know/No opinion

68 Please explain the reason for your response.

1	1000 character(s) maximum					

69 How difficult do you rate the quantification of the environmental benefits?

- Easy
- Rather easy
- Neither easy/nor difficult
- Rather difficult
- Difficult
- Very difficult
- I don't know

70 How would you rate this potential transparency requirement in terms of its suitability to mitigate the following risks?

	No impact on the risk	Only partially suited	Well suited	I don't know/No opinion
Overcompensation	0	0	•	0
Crowding-out of private investment	0	0	•	0
Greenwashing	0	0	•	0
Lack of cost effectiveness	0	0	•	0
Deep pockets distortions	0	0	•	0

A.4.2) Broadening

Broadening in this context refers to increasing the eligibility for participating in an aid scheme from a specific beneficiary or group of beneficiaries (in terms of technology or sector) to other beneficiaries, sectors or technologies that can contribute to the same objective. For instance, a broadening requirement could prevent that a Member State limits support only to energy efficiency measures in buildings, or only to solar electricity production, or to renewable energy or only to low emission mobility through electric cars. Rather, State aid rules could aim at opening schemes to a wider variety of projects that can all contribute to

the targeted objective (like decarbonisation). Similarly, if a Member State aims to incentivise industrial decarbonisation, State aid rules could avoid limiting the support to one company only and rather require a broadening of the proposed support so that eg. all companies active in the same sector, or all companies which are competing against each other, or all companies facing the same decarbonisation challenge are eligible to apply for subsidies.

By opening up the possibility of support to the entire sector, to all competing undertakings or all undertakings facing the same environmental challenge, competition distortions may be reduced. For example, expanding eligibility to include more cost-effective options, or direct/indirect competitors to the originally targeted beneficiaries might reduce the possibility for Member States to use State aid for providing competitive advantage to the beneficiaries over competitors by subsidising emissions reductions only in one specific factory, in one specific part of the country, or in one specific type of factory.

Provided that the broadening is not accompanied by an increase in the budget and is combined with a selection procedure, it might also reduce the cost of achieving environmental protection objectives, given that Member States would have the possibility to select the projects that they will support from a larger range of potentially cheaper projects [Broadening should not be understood as requiring Member States to increase the budget of their aid schemes or to broaden the support to more expensive approaches. Rather, such a requirement would be limited to requiring support for comparable projects when they can more cost-effectively achieve the targeted objective]. A significant challenge associated with such a "broadening" approach would be the need to come up with an objective basis for defining an appropriate scope – ie. is it sufficient to broaden a measure to include all undertakings producing the same good or service, would the Member State have to also include undertakings producing products or services that compete with the originally intended beneficiaries, or would the Member State have to include all possible projects that could contribute to the targeted objective? An additional complexity would arise in schemes pursuing more than one environmental objective.

71 Would you consider beneficial a requirement for Member States to broaden their support schemes for decarbonisation?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

72 Please explain.

1000 character(s) maximum

Broadening could lead to pressure to select the seemingly cheapest, cost-effective option across the board, creating a race to the bottom, when the race should be about the technologies and measures that will lead to greater environmental and health protection in the fastest way, and to fully reaching the Green Deal goals.

73 Would you consider beneficial a requirement for Member States to broaden their support schemes for environmental objectives other than decarbonisation?

- Yes
- No

I don't know

74	Please	explain	and s	specify	for	which	obiecti	ves vo	ou would	consider i	t necessary.
		CAPIGII	a	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		**:::				001101001	t ilooodaa ji

1	DUU character(s) maximum
	See comment under 72.

77 If you answered no to either 71) or 73), what are in your views the key risks or limitations of the broadening approach that would argue against it?

- Slow down development of projects/technologies that are currently expensive but have long-term potential.
- Reduces the possibility for Member States to tackle specific environmental issues with a limited budget.
- Difficulty to combine objectives
- Other (please explain).

79 How would you rate this potential broadening requirement in terms of its suitability to mitigate the following risks?

·	No impact on the risk	Not sufficient on its own to fully tackle the risk	Well suited	I don't know /No opinion
Overcompensation	0	0	0	•
Crowding-out of private investment	0	0	0	•
Greenwashing	0	0	0	•
Lack of cost effectiveness	0	©	0	•
Deep pockets distortions	0	©	0	•

A.4.3) Cross-border opening of aid schemes

Cross-border opening of aid schemes in this context refers to the possibility for State aid rules to require national support schemes to be broadened beyond national borders. Schemes would need to be open to projects in other Member States that can contribute to the achievement of the targeted objective [This would be similar to the rules already applicable for capacity mechanisms used to ensure security of electricity supplies. However, the existing sectoral rules for renewable energy (Renewables Directive) makes the use of cooperation mechanisms and the opening of support schemes across borders voluntary].

The requirement to enable foreign participation could be limited to a percentage of the available budget for a scheme.

As with the potential national broadening tool described above, it would not be appropriate for State aid rules to require Member States to increase the budget of their aid schemes. Rather, such a requirement would be limited to requiring support for comparable projects in other Member States when they can more cost-effectively achieve the targeted objective.

Such a requirement would increase competition and could potentially serve as an important control against the risk of Member States with greater financial resources being able to over subsidise environmental protection activities in their territory, giving a competitive advantage to firms located in their territory. However, it would also increase complexity and there may be challenges associated with monitoring and enforcing rules across borders, which would depend to some extent on the willingness of national authorities to cooperate.

However, there may also be situations when such approach would not be appropriate. Where a Member State targets a specifically local pollution problem – air quality in a city for example – it would not be likely to be appropriate to open the support scheme to projects in other Member States unless these projects were geographically close enough to cost effectively make a difference to the objective pursued.

80 Would you support a requirement for Member States to open their support schemes for decarbonisation across borders?

	Voc
-	YAC

O No

I don't know

82 Would you support a requirement for Member States to open their support schemes for environmental objectives other than decarbonisation across borders?

Yes

O No

I don't know

95 How would you rate this potential cross-border opening requirement in terms of its suitability to mitigate the following risks?

	No impact on the risk	Contributes to reducing the risk but not sufficient on its own	Well suited	I don't know /No opinion
Overcompensation	0	©	0	0
Crowding-out of private investment	0	©	0	0
Greenwashing	0	0	0	0
Lack of cost effectiveness	0	©	0	0
Deep pockets distortions	0	©	0	0

A.4.4) Competitive bidding process

Competitive bidding process refers to selecting beneficiaries and determining the aid amount for the beneficiaries through a non-discriminatory and competitive bidding process, that provides for the participation of a sufficient number of undertakings and where the aid is granted on the basis of either the initial bid submitted by the bidder or a clearing price. The budget or volume related to the bidding process is a binding constraint leading to a situation where not all bidders can receive aid. Tenders can be limited to specific categories of projects.

Competitive bidding processes in general have been useful to drive down costs and increase the efficiency of the support and help ensure the proportionality of aid. They can be complex to design and may increase the administrative burden and costs especially for smaller participants, but they avoid the need for administrative assessments of the amount of aid that projects should receive.

To ensure the proportionality of the aid, competitive bidding processes require a sufficient number of projects and those projects should be sufficiently comparable. There may therefore be areas in which competitive bidding processes are less suitable because there are no enough projects on a regular basis to organise a competitive bidding process or because projects are so diverse that a comparison of costs only would not seem adequate.

96 Do you think that competitive bidding processes should be the general rule to allocate investment and operating aid for energy and environmental purposes?

- Yes
- O No
- I don't know/No opinion

A requirement for a competitive bidding process could be combined with other requirements being considered in this consultation, for example the potential requirement for broadening and the potential 'transparency' requirement for calculating the cost of achieving the targeted objective. If a broadening requirement were to be combined with tendering it could be expected to lead to a further reduction of the costs of support. Also, when combined with tender, the broadening requirement could ensure that the tender is competitive by contrast to a tender limited to a sector in which there are only too few competitors.

107 In your view, would a competitive bidding procedure that selected the cheapest projects to deliver industrial decarbonisation within a given sector and on national basis (steel only, cement only, fertilisers only) be sufficiently competitive to ensure that aid is limited to the minimum necessary to trigger the projects?

- Yes
- O No
- I don't know

110 Competitive bidding procedures open to several technologies/sectors usually focus on one or very few parameters, on which participants bid and are compared, such as the actual aid amount for the construction of the project or the cost of delivering a MWh of renewable energy or the costs of reducing one ton of CO2. Are there important environmental or social costs or benefits that cannot be internalised in a competitive bidding procedure with a broader scope?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know/No opinion

111 If yes, which one(s)?

Costs for electricity grid reinforcement

Costs for system integration

Long-term potential of projects/technologies

- Lock-in into a technology which is not suitable in the long term
- Trade-offs with other environmental impacts (e.g. on local air quality, biodiversity, etc.)

Coordination with other policies (e.g. security of supply)

Other (please specify)

113 How would you rate a competitive bidding procedure across heterogeneous projects? In such a procedure, projects of different types all contributing to decarbonisation would compete and be compared on the basis of the cost per unit of CO2 emission reduction. This could involve for example a competitive bidding process in which renewable electricity and heat, insulation of buildings, acquisition of clean vehicles, process energy efficiency, waste heat recovery, renewable and low carbon hydrogen production/consumption, and CCS projects all participate.

	Not at all suited (no impact on that risk)	Contributes to reducing the risk but not sufficient on its own	Well suited	Don't know/No opinion
Overcompensation	0	0	0	•
Crowding-out of private investment	0	©	0	•
Greenwashing	0	0	0	•
Missing cost effectiveness	0	©	0	•

Deep pockets	0	©	0	•
distortions				

A.4.5) Public consultation

The public consultation envisaged in this section would require Member States/authorities setting up a support scheme to publish as part of its preparation a consultation open to all interested parties on a public platform, covering the main features of the support scheme, as well as the proposed eligibility and the way projects would be selected for support. The responses received would be published, together with a summary report with the Member States' reactions to the main comments. This summary report would be provided to the Commission as part of the notification of the State aid scheme for approval. Failure to conduct the prior public consultation would lead to the incompatibility of the aid measure.

Such a consultation would entail a significant administrative burden for Member States/authorities but could be a useful tool notably for larger and more complex schemes and those involving higher budgets. In particular, if a requirement for broadening (as explained above) is introduced, a requirement for public consultation could serve as a basis for determining whether the eligibility for the scheme is appropriate – ie. the Member State could consult the market on the proposed eligibility, providing an opportunity for market participants to provide evidence if they are aware of projects that could more cost effectively contribute to the objectives targeted by the scheme. The Member State could then consider broadening the scope of the proposed scheme to include such projects (and this information would be available to the Commission when the Commission examines the compatibility of the scheme). Another type of consultation that might be useful is a public consultation aiming at probing the market for potential project to verify that there is a need for a support scheme and that it would not crowd out private projects.

116 On a scale from 1 to 5, how useful would you consider such a consultation to ensure a proposed scheme is reasonably open to competitors and avoids unduly distorting competition?

1	(not	useful	at	all	

- [©] 2
- [©] 3
- 0 4
- 5 (very useful)
- I don't know/No opinion

117 When should such a consultation requirement apply?

- It should not apply to any measures
- It should apply to all measures regardless of their cost/complexity
- It should apply to all measures exceeding a certain budget threshold
- It should apply to all measures involving certain complex features eg. participation of multiple project types (please explain)
- It should apply to all areas as means to verify the necessity of an aid scheme

- It should apply to all notifiable amendments (i.e., amendments requiring a new State aid decision) to measures that originally required a consultation
- It should apply only to notifiable amendments related to certain complex features eg. participation of multiple project types
- Other (please explain)
- I don't know

A.4.6) Summary

Having responded to the questions above, please summarise your views by completing the following table.

119 On a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree): to which extent to you agree with the following statements?

	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know /No opinion
Currently, State aid for environmental protection is well spent.	0	0	•	0	0	0
State Aid should allow Member States to target what they consider the most pressing environmental issues in their national context regardless of competition distortions	0	0	0	0	•	0
Reducing the cost of environmental aid makes it more acceptable	•	0	0	0	0	0
Improving the transparency of the cost of environmental protection makes aid for environmental protection more acceptable	0	0	0	0	•	0
State aid rules should prevent Member States subsidising only more expensive ways to achieve environmental protection objectives and should require Member States to also/instead support more cost effective ways to achieve environmental protection objectives	•	0	0	0	0	0
Awarding environmental aid through tenders makes it more acceptable	0	0	•	0	0	0
Opening environmental aid schemes to as many contributors to the environmental objective as possible makes it more acceptable	0	0	•	0	0	0
Opening environmental aid schemes cross border makes them more acceptable	0	0	0	0	0	•
Making the rules clearer and simpler would significantly facilitate their use	0	0	0	0	0	•

120 Other than the potential tools explained here (transparency, broadening etc) do
you have any other suggestions as to how the risks of competition distortions could
be mitigated through state aid rules?
© Yes
[©] No
I don't know
A.4.7) Administrative burden
126 Do you have any suggestions for limiting the complexity and/or reducing the
administrative burden of the options listed above?
Yes
No
I don't know
128 Do you think that simplified rules should apply for smaller projects?
Yes
No
No opinion

B) Energy Intensive Users

130 Over the past years, taxes and levies on electricity, such as those financing renewable support schemes, have continued to increase. At the same time, the energy component of the final (retail) electricity price has reduced both in absolute and relative terms [see DG Energy, Energy Prices and Costs Report, 2019]. In the context of the Green Deal and the planned decarbonisation, how do you expect the various components of the electricity bill to change in light of the EU's increased climate ambitions?

·	Decrease by more than 50%	Decrease by 20- 50%	Decrease by 10- 20%	Decrease by less than 0-10%	Remain stable	Increase by 0- 10%	Increase by 10- 20%	Increase by 20- 50%	Increase by more than 50%	I don't know /No opinion
Energy component	0	0	0	0	©	0	0	0	0	•
Levies to finance Renewables	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	•
Levies to finance other decarbonisation objectives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	•
Network charges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Energy taxes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	•

131 Based on the expected levels of levies to finance renewables and other decarbonisation objectives ("decarbonisation levies") or energy taxes, as indicated in the question above, on a scale of 1 (none) to 6 (very high), how would you rate the risk that EIUs would relocate from your Member State assuming that the existing exemptions for EIUs will continue to apply?

	1 (none)	2 (low)	3 (medium-low)	4 (medium-high)	5 (high)	6 (very high)	I don't know/No opinion
Energy taxes	0	0	0	0	0	0	•
Decarbonisation levies	0	0	0	0	0	0	•

132 Based on the expected levels of decarbonisation levies or energy taxes, on a scale of 1 (none) to 6 (very high), how would you rate the risk that EIUs would relocate from your Member State if the exemptions for EIUs were removed?

	1 (none)	2 (low)	3 (medium-low)	4 (medium-high)	5 (high)	6 (very high)	I don't know/No opinion
Energy taxes	0	0	0	0	0	0	•
Decarbonisation levies	0	0	0	0	0	0	•

133 The level of taxes and levies on electricity, both in absolute value and as a share of total price of the input, can affect the incentives for energy intensive users to electrify their production processes. How would you rate, on a scale of 1 (none) to 6 (very high), the risk that the expected levels of taxes and levies on electricity will significantly impair this electrification process?

- 1 (none)
- ⁰ 2 (low)
- 3 (medium-low)
- 4 (medium-high)
- 5 (high)
- 6 (very high)
- I don't know

134 How would you rate, on a scale of 1 (should not be used) to 5 (very good choice), the use of the following sources of financing for the support to decarbonisation schemes?

Support for decarbonisation policies should be financed from:	1 (should not be used)	2 (not a good choice)	3 (medium)	4 (good choice)	5 (very good /preferred choice)	I don't know/No opinion
Surcharges on electricity	0	0	0	0	0	•
Surcharges on fossil fuels	0	0	0	0	0	•
ETS revenues	0	0	0	0	0	•
Specific charges imposed on industry	0	0	0	0	0	•
Environmental taxes imposed on industry	0	0	0	0	0	•
Environmental taxes imposed on the economy	0	0	0	0	0	•
General budget	0	0	0	0	0	•
Other (please specify)	0	0	0	0	0	•

136 Do you consider the need for reductions for EIUs could be reduced or eliminated, if decarbonisation measures were financed through means other than surcharges on electricity?

Yes

No

I don't know/No opinion

138 In your opinion, which of the following parameters, on a scale of 1 (not relevant) to 5 (very relevant), are the most relevant to identify the sectors that will be at risk of relocation due to taxes and levies with a decarbonisation objective?

·	1 (not relevant)	2 (slightly relevant)	3 (relevant)	4 (rather relevant)	5 (very relevant)	I don't know /No opinion
Exposure to international trade ("trade intensity")	©	©	0	0	•	•
Exposure to electricity costs ("electro intensity")	0	0	0	0	0	•
Exposure to a risk of carbon leakage as determined for the purposes of the ETS Guidelines 2020-2030	0	•	0	0	•	•
Other (please specify)	0	0	0	0	0	•

140 In your opinion, in order to minimise the risk of relocation while ensuring level playing field, should the possibility of granting reductions to EIUs be limited to only those Member States that have reached a certain EU-wide minimum level (in absolute amount) of decarbonisation levies?

Yes
1 (7.7)

O No

I don't know/No opinion

Other (please specify)

142 In your opinion, should the granting of reductions to EIUs be made conditional upon requirements to invest part of the support in energy efficiency and/or the decarbonisation of production processes?

0	Yes
	1 53

O No

- I don't know/No opinion
- Other (please specify)

Final comments and document upload

144 If there is anything else you would like to say which may be relevant for the impact assessment of the EEAG, feel free to do so.

1000 character(s) maximum

We support the goal of aligning Green Deal objectives with the future EEAG. The Commission needs to present especially on how the EEAG will contribute to reaching the zero pollution ambition, and to implementing the foreseen zero pollution measures. We urge the Commission to further work on advancing the methodologies for cost-benefit of decarbonisation and environmental measures, especially when it comes to assessing the full health benefits.

HEAL position on zero pollution: https://www.env-health.org/beat-pollution-prevent-disease/

145 If you wish to attach relevant supporting documents for any of your replies to the questions above, feel free to do so.

The maximum file size is 1 MB

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

146 Please indicate whether the Commission services may contact you for further details on the information submitted, if required.

- Yes
- O No

As mentioned in the Introductory Part of this questionnaire, the Commission is currently conducting a consultation on the relationship between competition law and the Green Deal. In this framework, the Commission is examining to what extent green bonuses could be allowed for measures or projects delivering high environmental protection, whether that high environmental contribution should be identified thanks to the EU taxonomy or not and how risks of overcompensation can be avoided when normal aid intensities already cover all extra environmental costs.

In the call for contributions, stakeholders are invited to examine among others the following questions, which are also relevant for the EEAG revision. The questions are reproduced here for the sake of transparency. The Commission invites stakeholders to submit their comments to this consultation on the role of competition law in the Green Deal to COMP-GREEN-DEAL@ec.europa.eu.

- 3. If you consider that more State aid to support environmental objectives should be allowed, what are your ideas on how that should be done?
- a. Should this take the form of allowing more aid (or aid on easier terms) for environmentally beneficial projects than for comparable projects which do not bring the same benefits ("green bonus")? If so, how should this green bonus be defined?
- b. Which criteria should inform the assessment of a green bonus? Could you give concrete examples

where, in your view, a green bonus would be justified, compared to examples where it would not be justified? Please provide reasons explaining your choice.

4. How should we define positive environmental benefits? a. Should it be by reference to the EU taxonomy and, if yes, should it be by reference to all sustainability criteria of the EU taxonomy? Or would any kind of environmental benefit be sufficient?

Thank you for responding to this questionnaire.

Useful links

Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-conte/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52014XC0628%2801%29)

General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX: 02014R0651-20170710)

<u>Fitness Check (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2044-Fitness-check-of-20-State-aid-modernisation-package-railways-guidelines-and-short-term-export-credit-insurance)</u>

Contact

Contact Form